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Note
LAWYERS GONE WILD:
ARE DEPOSITIONS STILL A “CIVIL” PROCEDURE?
ERIC B. MILLER
Depositions are an extremely effective and widely used discovery
device. Unfortunately, attorneys and litigants seeking to frustrate their
opponents often abuse the deposition process by using obstructionist, or
“Rambo,” tactics. This Note examines different types of deposition
misconduct and the different approaches courts have used to remedy these
problems. This Note then looks at deposition misconduct in Connecticut
and the sanctioning power of its state courts. Finally, this Note sets forth
several suggestions on how to better curb deposition misconduct, including
more frequent judicial intervention, greater use of video depositions to
provide better evidence of misconduct, and wider observance of the
American College of Trial Lawyers Code of Pretrial Conduct.
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LAWYERS GONE WILD:
ARE DEPOSITIONS STILL A “CIVIL” PROCEDURE?
ERIC B. MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Depositions are one of the most effective discovery tools in a lawyer’s
arsenal. They are a way to gather information that has not been filtered by
opposing counsel, they allow lawyers to evaluate deponents as witnesses,
and they allow immediate follow-up on unexpected, spontaneous answers.1
Depositions can also expose weaknesses in an opponent’s case and lead to
discovering faults in one’s own. Statements made during depositions can
be used for impeachment and for refreshing a witness’s recollection in the
courtroom. Depositions are also a way to preserve witnesses’ testimony in
case they cannot testify at trial. If one’s ultimate goal is settlement,
depositions that show weaknesses in an opponent’s case can provide
considerable settlement leverage. One court has rightly recognized the
importance of depositions as “the factual battleground where the vast
majority of litigation actually takes place.”2
The deposition process is, however, subject to abuse by attorneys and
by litigants who seek to obstruct it. Vulgar and abusive language, witness
coaching, “speaking” objections and improper instructions not to answer,
and even physical violence have been known to occur, thus calling into
question the usefulness of depositions as a discovery device. These
problems arise from the reality that depositions are rarely supervised and
largely unregulated.3 Different jurisdictions have implemented rules and
codes to avoid these practices,4 but inside the deposition room, with no
judge present, lawyers sometimes perceive unfettered opportunities to
inquire or interfere with the inquiry, which too often leads to offensive

*

Clark University, B.A. 2006; Clark University, M.A.T. 2007; University of Connecticut School
of Law, J.D. 2010. I would like to thank Mark Dubois for his comments and guidance throughout this
process. This Note is dedicated to my parents for their endless support and encouragement. All errors
contained herein are mine and mine alone.
1
A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L. REV. 273, 278 (1998).
2
Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
3
See Interim Report of the Comm. on Civility of the Seventh Fed. Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D.
371, 388 (1991); James G. Carr & Craig T. Smith, Depositions and the Court, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 635,
636 (1997); Dickerson, supra note 1, at 278; Alyson Nelson, Deposition Conduct: Texas’s New
Discovery Rules End Up Taking Another Jab at the Rambos of Litigation, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1471,
1474 (1999); Christopher J. Piazzola, Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why Ethics
2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1197, 1215 (2003).
4
See infra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
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behavior. At the same time, courts do not address deposition misconduct
with great regularity and often fail to sanction such misbehavior.
Several scholarly articles have suggested ways to remedy this
misconduct, ranging from encouraging lawyers to study and practice the
teachings of Jesus Christ,5 to simply telling lawyers to “shut up and knock
it off.”6 This Note argues that courts should intervene with more frequency
to establish clear expectations of proper behavior and to punish abuses of
the deposition process. This Note proposes several methods for doing so.
Part II of this Note examines different kinds of misconduct that occur
at depositions. Part III analyzes the different sanctions courts have
traditionally used to address these types of behaviors and the sources of
judicial authority for such actions. The approaches used by courts are
usually either monetary or non-monetary in nature. After looking at what
punishments courts have implemented, Part IV discusses Connecticut’s
approach to disruptive deposition tactics, with a look at sanctioning power
and the recent Connecticut Superior Court decision in Faile v. Zarich,7 and
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Ramin v. Ramin.8 Part V
concludes with suggestions for curbing abusive deposition practices,
including more frequent judicial intervention, referrals to professional
disciplinary boards, wider acceptance of the American College of Trial
Lawyers Code of Pretrial Conduct, and more frequent videotaping of
depositions to act as a deterrent to and provide stronger evidence of
misconduct.
II. THE LAWYER DID WHAT?
It is worth noting a reality in researching deposition misconduct;
sanctions for such misbehavior are not pursued in court with great
regularity and it is difficult to get a good sense of what is happening at
depositions if problems are not reported.9 A 1989 study of the Central
District of Los Angeles County Superior Court found that motions seeking
sanctions for deposition misconduct constituted only 15.9% of all sampled
motions for pre-trial sanctions and 16.6% of all motions for discovery

5
L. Timothy Perrin, Lawyer as Peacemaker: A Christian Response to Rambo Litigation, 32 PEPP.
L. REV. 519, 534–35 (2005).
6
Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618,
1619 (1996).
7
No. HHDX04CV5015994S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1779 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2008).
8
915 A.2d 790 (Conn. 2007).
9
See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“Currently at bar is an issue
on which, despite its presence in nearly every case brought under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
there is not a lot of caselaw: the conduct of lawyers at depositions.”); Carr & Smith, supra note 3, at
635 (“Though reported instances are rare, anecdotal indications suggest that abuse by inquiring counsel
is recurrent, especially in metropolitan areas . . . .” (citing Marvin E. Aspen, The Search For Renewed
Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 513 (1994))).
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10

sanctions. Surveys of attorneys in the Seventh Circuit, conducted by the
Committee on Civility of the Seventh Circuit in the early 1990s,
demonstrated that deposition abuse is commonplace.11 The examples that
follow are therefore limited to reported and unreported decisions and
scholarly articles, and undoubtedly do not accurately reflect the full extent
of deposition misconduct around the country.
A. Vulgar & Abusive Language
One type of deposition misconduct is an attorney’s use of vulgar or
abusive language. In Saldana v. Kmart Corp., the plaintiff’s attorney, Lee
Rohn, said “fuck” four times and was generally hostile and abusive to
opposing counsel during pre-trial discovery.12 On two occasions, during
depositions, Rohn said: “Todd, I don’t want to fuck around,” and “I will
put my remarks on the record as I’m entitled. I don’t need to be lectured
by you, sir. Don’t fuck with me.”13 After a jury verdict in her client’s
favor, Attorney Rohn—perhaps to rub it in—sent a letter to the defendant’s
expert witness which stated:
Since you threw down the gauntlet, I thought you would be
interested in knowing what the jury decided. The jury
awarded Ms. Bell $475,000.
They discounted your
testimony completely and felt you were pompous and
arrogant. I did concur with one of the jurors who referred to
you as a Nazi.14
It is not surprising that these actions were brought to the court’s attention.
No review of deposition misconduct would be complete without
reference to the infamous Joe Jamail of the Texas Bar. In Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
raised, sua sponte, the issue of Attorney Jamail’s conduct at a deposition in
a Delaware action that was taken in Texas, stating that they were forced “to
add this Addendum. . . . One particular instance of misconduct during a
deposition in this case demonstrates such an astonishing lack of
professionalism and civility that it is worthy of special note here as a
10
Florrie Young Roberts, Pre-Trial Sanctions: An Empirical Study, 23 PAC. L.J. 1, 57 & n.101
(2001). This study sampled a two month period in the Central District of Los Angeles County Superior
Court. It determined that out of 813 motions for pre-trial sanctions during that period, 516 were
“studiable.” A motion was “studiable” if it included points and authorities, declaration of the facts,
amount of sanction requested, and an actual ruling by a judge. Id. at 3–4, 15 & n.32.
11
See Interim Report of the Comm. on Civility of the Seventh Fed. Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D.
371, 388 (1991) (noting that surveyed attorneys frequently encountered hostility, witness coaching,
improper instructions not to answer, and other abusive conduct during depositions).
12
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 629, 637–38 (D.V.I. 1999), rev’d in part, 260 F.3d. 228
(3d Cir. 2001).
13
Id. at 637 (emphasis omitted).
14
Id. at 638.
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lesson . . . of conduct not to be tolerated or repeated.”
a few choice excerpts to illustrate Mr. Jamail’s tactics:

The Court recited

MR. JAMAIL: He’s not going to answer that. Certify it.
I’m going to shut it down if you don’t go to your next
question.
MR. JOHNSTON: No. Joe, Joe—
MR. JAMAIL: Don’t “Joe” me, asshole. You can ask some
questions, but get off of that. I’m tired of you. You could
gag a maggot off a meat wagon. Now, we’ve helped you
every way we can.
MR. JOHNSTON: Let’s just take it easy.
MR. JAMAIL: No, we’re not going to take it easy. Get done
with this.
....
MR. JOHNSTON: Are you finished?
MR. JAMAIL: I may be and you may be. Now, you want to
sit here and talk to me, fine. This deposition is going to be
over with. You don’t know what you’re doing. Obviously
someone wrote out a long outline of stuff for you to ask.
You have no concept of what you’re doing.
Now, I’ve tolerated you for three hours. If you’ve got
another question, get on with it. This is going to stop one
hour from now, period. Go.16
The court noted that, “[a]lthough busy and overburdened, Delaware trial
courts are ‘but a phone call away’ and would be responsive to the plight of
a party and its counsel bearing the brunt of such misconduct.”17
Attorneys can also be sanctioned for not acting to stop their witnesses
from using profanity during depositions. In GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., a
breach of contract case, Aaron Wider, the owner of HTFC, was deposed in
what the court called a “spectacular failure of the deposition process.”18
The deposition took two days, and the court found that “Wider used the
word ‘fuck’ and variants thereof no less than 73 times,” compared with the
word ‘contract’ which was used only fourteen times.19 Perhaps more

15

Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 (Del. 1994).
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 55 (quoting Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
18
GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 184 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
19
Id. at 187.
16
17
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noteworthy in the eyes of the judge was Wider’s attorney’s failure to stop
the offensive language during the deposition.20
Courts have also issued orders when an attorney has made derogatory
remarks to another attorney based on gender or marital status.21 In
Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., defense counsel
took a three-day deposition of the plaintiff’s representative.22 Thomas
Decea, attorney for the plaintiff, “repeatedly directed the witness not to
answer certain questions posed to him, which were, on many occasions,
followed by inappropriate, insulting, and derogatory remarks against
[Attorney Michelle] Rice concerning her gender, marital status, and
competence,” including asking Attorney Rice several times whether she
was married.23 A few examples include:
MR. DECEA: This is not a white collar interview that you’re
sitting here interviewing something with your cute little thing
going on.
MS. RICE: My cute little thing?
MR. DECEA: This is a deposition that has rules about what
kinds of questions you can ask and how to ask them. You’ve
led him the entire morning. You led him all day Monday
when there’s no reason to lead him. If you want to lead him
to get into a subject area I can understand that and I’ll let that
go, but when you get to the subject area ask him nonleading
questions.
MS. RICE: Mr. Decea, you conduct the type of deposition
you wish to conduct, I conduct the type of deposition I wish
to conduct.
MR. DECEA: And I respect that. I’m just saying respect my
defense, respect my defense of the litigation, that’s all.
Nothing personal, dear.
MS. RICE: Nothing personal, dear, let’s see. I can’t tell you
the number of things that you have said were more than
personal and certainly offensive and probably—
....
20
See id. at 196 (noting that Attorney Ziccardi’s conduct during the deposition was undertaken in
bad faith and his failure to intervene was willful).
21
See, e.g., Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding
unprofessional conduct warranting sanctions where a male attorney stated to a female attorney: “I don’t
have to talk to you, little lady”; “[t]ell that little mouse over there to pipe down”; “[w]hat do you know,
young girl”; “[b]e quiet, little girl”; and “[g]o away, little girl”).
22
Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., No. 600973-2007, 2007 WL 4901555,
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2007).
23
Id.
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MS. RICE: It doesn’t matter.
MR. DECEA: It does, hon.
....
MR. DECEA: You better get somebody else here to try this
case, otherwise you’re gonna be one sorry girl.
MS. RICE: A sorry girl?
MR. DECEA: Yes.24
Surprisingly, Attorney Decea claimed—to no avail—that he was “not
aware of any rule or law which require[d] civility between counsel.”25
B. Witness Coaching
Another tactic used by attorneys inside the deposition room is witness
coaching through suggestive or “speaking” objections. Ordinarily,
objections to the form of the question should be made succinctly—to be
preserved for trial—and then the witness may answer.26 It is improper to
have extended speaking objections suggesting an answer to a pending
question. As the court in Hall v. Clifton Precision noted, “once a
deposition begins, the right to counsel is somewhat tempered by the
underlying goal of our discovery rules: getting to the truth. . . . Once a
witness has been prepared . . . that witness is on his or her own.”27 When
attorneys begin to suggest answers for their witnesses, depositions stray
from their truth-seeking function.
New York’s rule governing objections at depositions reads: “Every
objection raised during a deposition shall be stated succinctly and framed
so as not to suggest an answer to the deponent . . . . [D]uring the course of
the examination persons in attendance shall not make statements or
comments that interfere with the questioning.”28 Simmons v. Minerley
involved extensive witness coaching at a deposition.29 At his client’s
deposition, plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Genna, made numerous suggestive
objections and gave instructions not to answer, including this exchange
highlighted by the court:
The plaintiff was then asked by defendants’ counsel:
“In that Notice of Claim, did you allege that there was an
24

Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *1.
26
See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2) (“An objection must be stated concisely in a non-argumentative
and nonsuggestive manner.” (emphasis added)).
27
Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
28
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 221.1(b) (2010).
29
Simmons v. Minerley, No. 5554/06, 2007 WL 2409595, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24, 2007).
25
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obstructed view of the intersection? Yes or no?”
At that point, Mr. Genna stated:
“I will not allow him to answer that because what’s in the
Notice—there’s no testimony that he’s read it and knows
what’s in it, so there’s no foundation for that question. What
the document says and what he knows it says may be two
different things.”
Mr. O’Connor stated:
“I know that. We’re not supposed to say any of this. We can
do it outside of the presence of the witness.”30
The court held that Attorney Genna’s objection to lack of foundation was
improper under the New York rules—he should have objected and then let
the deponent answer the question.31
In R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., the
court noted that the attorneys on both sides were at fault for “depositions
[that] have been contaminated from start to finish with interrupted
questions, ad hominem comments, and argumentative colloquy, sometimes
running on for pages.”32 As this Note later examines, the court came up
with a creative penalty for the attorneys.33 Courts are clearly becoming
more and more “intolerant of ‘“speaking” objections to questions [that
have] the barely concealed purpose of communicating to the witness how
[he or] she should answer.’”34
C. Improper Objections & Instructions Not To Answer
In most jurisdictions, attorneys at depositions may only object and
instruct a deponent not to answer a question in order to preserve a privilege
or to enforce a limitation from an order of the court.35 If the questioning is
being conducted in bad faith or so as to annoy or embarrass the deponent,
some jurisdictions will allow objections and instructions not to answer so
that the deponent’s attorney can seek the assistance of the court, often via a
30

Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
Id.
32
R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 102 F.R.D. 39, 40 (D. Md. 1983).
33
See infra Part III.A.
34
Victoria E. Brieant, Techniques and Potential Conflicts in the Handling of Depositions, Course
No. SN040 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 583, 596 (2007) (quoting Heller v. Wofsey, Certilman, Haft, Lebow & Balin,
No. 86 Civ. 9867, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7765, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1989)).
35
See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2) (“A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when
necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion
under Rule 30(d)(3).”); CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-30(b), in OFFICIAL 2010 CONNECTICUT
PRACTICE BOOK 85, 200 (2010) [hereinafter CONN. PRACTICE BOOK], available at http://www.jud.ct.
gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB_2010.pdf (containing almost identical language to the Federal
Rules); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 221.2 (2010) (same).
31
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motion for a protective order. In Riddell Sports Inc. v. Brooks, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that
instructions not to answer that do not fall within these categories are
generally inappropriate.37 Likewise, the District Court of Maryland has
held that instructions not to answer, which do not conform to the Federal
Rules, are “presumptively improper.”38
What objections are permitted at depositions? Relevance objections,
for example, are usually not necessary and are improper.39 Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), objections to the form of the
question are proper if the question is:
1. Leading or suggestive;
2. Ambiguous or uncertain;
3. Compound;
4. Assum[ing] facts not in evidence;
5. Call[ing] for a narration;
6. Call[ing] for speculation or conjecture; or
7. Argumentative.40
In Connecticut, certain objections are waived unless made during the
deposition. This rule establishing waiver is embodied in Connecticut
Practice Book section 13-31(c)(3)(B), which states:
Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in
the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the
questions or answers . . . and errors of any kind which might
be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented, are
waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the
taking of the deposition.41
In Lowell v. Shustock, the court noted that this rule “exists because of a
recognition that many of the objections made at a deposition are entirely
36
See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3)(A) (“At any time during a deposition, the deponent or a party may
move to terminate or limit it on the ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner that
unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party.”); CONN. SUPERIOR COURT
RULES § 13-30(c), in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 35, at 200 (using language tracking the
Federal Rule); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 221.2 (2008) (containing similar language as
the Federal Rule, but adding: “A deponent shall answer all questions at a deposition, except . . . (c)
when the question is plainly improper and would, if answered, cause significant prejudice to any
person.”).
37
Riddell Sports Inc. v. Brooks, 158 F.R.D. 555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
38
Boyd v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., 173 F.R.D. 143, 147 (D. Md. 1997).
39
See In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 618 (D. Nev. 1998).
40
Id. at 618.
41
CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-31(c)(3)(B), in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 35, at
202.
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capable of being fixed on the spot, and that doing so at the deposition stage
helps trials go more smoothly.”42 Judge Miller ordered that the contested
deposition continue, and that “[c]ounsel who want to preserve objections
for trial will . . . be expected to state the ground for any form objection
they choose to make when this deposition resumes.”43
The FRCP contain an identical rule regarding waiver of objections if
not made at depositions.44 In Oberlin v. Marlin American Corp., the
Seventh Circuit held that defense counsel’s failure to object to the form of
certain leading questions at the deposition resulted in a waiver of his right
to object to their introduction at trial.45 Similarly, in Elyria-Lorain
Broadcasting Co. v. Lorain Journal Co., a witness’s deposition was
introduced at trial.46 When the deposition was offered, the opposing
attorney tried to object to some of the deposition questions as leading. The
Sixth Circuit held that the attorney had waived his objection by not making
it at the deposition.47
D. Physical Violence
There have been rare instances where attorneys at depositions have
engaged in physical altercations. In Connecticut in 2004, Attorney James
Brewer took a videotaped deposition of Lt. Jack Casey of the West
Hartford Police in a case concerning the suicide of a police officer.48
Brewer began asking questions that defense Attorney O’Brien would not
permit the deponent to answer.49 Eventually, O’Brien declared the
deposition to be adjourned, at which point Brewer physically attacked
O’Brien and Casey.50 Both O’Brien and Casey filed grievances and
Brewer was charged with several felonies and misdemeanors.51
Ultimately, Brewer was convicted only of misdemeanor breach of peace.52
Brewer withdrew from practice after the deposition and received a ninetyday suspension.53 In June 2005, Brewer was disbarred by Judge Holzberg
for failing to comply with certain court orders regarding medical
42
Lowell v. Shustock, No. CV075008834S, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2759, at *6 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Oct. 19, 2007).
43
Id.
44
See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(d)(3)(B) (“An objection to an error or irregularity at an oral examination
is waived if: (i) it relates to . . . the form of a question or answer . . . or other matters that might have
been corrected at that time; and (ii) it is not timely made during the deposition.”).
45
Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1328–29 (7th Cir. 1979).
46
Elyria-Lorain Broad. Co. v. Lorain Journal Co., 298 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1961).
47
Id.
48
Brewer v. Town of W. Hartford, No. 3:05cv849, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72734, at *2 (D. Conn.
Sept. 28, 2007).
49
Id.
50
Id. at *2–3.
51
Id. at *3.
52
Id. at *4.
53
Id. at *3.
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examinations. In September 2005, Judge Blue ordered a presentment at
which Brewer failed to appear.55 As a result, Judge Blue disbarred Brewer
for a period of five years.56
III. HOW COURTS ADDRESS DEPOSITION MISCONDUCT
Generally, courts have broad discretion to fashion sanctions for
deposition misconduct.57 But where does this power come from?
Congress gave federal courts power to regulate attorney conduct in 28
U.S.C. § 1927, which states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.58
The statute provides that the sanctions can be imposed directly against the
attorney where the judge finds the misconduct was the attorney’s idea as
opposed to the client’s. Such sanctions are an important tool for courts in
deterring and punishing misbehavior at depositions, and are also a way to
protect clients from paying for the transgressions of their attorneys.59
Different jurisdictions have also promulgated rules designed to
regulate deposition conduct.60 The FRCP provide that “[t]he court may
impose an appropriate sanction—including the reasonable expenses and
attorney’s fees incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays,
or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.”61 Rule 30(d) was added
in 1993 to give courts express power to punish excessive objecting,
speaking objections, and improper instructions not to answer.62 Upon a
motion, a district court can also issue orders pertaining to any step in the
discovery process, including depositions. If the district court where the
action is pending gives an order regarding discovery that is disobeyed,
courts have additional authority under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), which states:
54

Id. at *4.
Id.
56
Id.
57
See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
58
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
59
Carr & Smith, supra note 3, at 644.
60
See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 282–84 & nn.40–50. Specifically, FRCP 30 governs conduct at
depositions. AG Equip. Co. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-556-CVE-PJC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99915, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 2008).
61
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2).
62
Dickerson, supra note 1, at 280–81; David F. Herr & Nicole Narotzky, Sanctions in Civil
Litigation: A Review of Sanctions by Rule, Statute, and Inherent Power, Course No. SN009 A.L.I.A.B.A. 1741, 1810–11 (2007).
55
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If a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent . . .
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the
court where the action is pending may issue further just
orders. They may include the following:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or
other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of
the action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or
opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in
part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient
party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any
order except an order to submit to a physical or mental
examination.63
Instead of or in addition to any of the above orders, district courts may also
order expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) to be paid by the
misbehaving party, the misbehaving party’s attorney, or both, “unless the
failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”64 While some of the
available relief is to be used only in extreme circumstances, these rules
give the courts considerable power to craft an appropriate sanction for an
abusive party.65
A court dealing with deposition misconduct has many options
available. These can be grouped into two broader categories: monetary
sanctions and non-monetary sanctions. This section examines how the
courts resolved many of the instances of deposition misconduct discussed
in Part II.

63

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C)(1).
65
See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (stating that
“the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the
district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to
warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct”); Schreiber v. Moe,
No. 06-2414, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22927, at *13 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2008) (noting that dismissal is a
“harsh sanction which the court should order only in extreme situations”).
64
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A. Monetary Sanctions
Courts will often order monetary sanctions when faced with conduct
that frustrates the deposition process. Such sanctions can include
reimbursement for costs of bringing the misconduct to the attention of the
court, including associated reasonable attorneys’ fees, or any other reason
that the court deems appropriate.66 In GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., the
court sanctioned the deponent, Aaron Wider, for “1) engaging in hostile,
uncivil, and vulgar conduct; 2) impeding, delaying, and frustrating fair
examination; and 3) failing to answer and providing intentionally evasive
answers to deposition questions.”67 The court based its decision on FRCP
37(a)(3)(B)(i) and 30(d)(2).68 The court also found that Wider’s attorney,
Joseph Ziccardi, “persistently failed to intercede and correct Wider’s
violations of the Federal Rules.”69 The court sanctioned Attorney Ziccardi,
stating that “any reasonable attorney representing Wider would have
intervened in an effort to curb Wider’s misconduct.”70 Wider and Ziccardi
were jointly and severally sanctioned over $16,000 for GMAC’s costs and
attorneys’ fees for the deposition, and were ordered to pay over $13,000
for costs associated with bringing the motion to the court.71 The court
denied Ziccardi’s motion for reconsideration.72
The trial court in Simmons v. Minerley found that the attorney’s
extensive witness coaching “not only failed to comport with the spirit of
the [New York] Civil Practice Law and Rules,” but also violated specific
provisions of the rules.73 Specifically, the judge found that the attorney
“repeatedly directed his client not to answer; repeatedly interrupted the
deposition; and repeatedly provided instructions in his statements as to
how the witness should respond.”74 The judge ordered the attorney to pay
$2500 to defense counsel for the costs incurred as a result of his conduct at
the deposition, and ordered the plaintiff to reappear for a further
deposition.75
Courts can also get creative with monetary sanctions, as is evidenced
by the court’s decision in R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. U.S. Fire
Insurance Co.76 The judge found both attorneys at fault for frustrating the
goal of discovery. Because both parties had engaged in the offensive
66

See Carr & Smith, supra note 3, at 644.
GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 186, 193 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
Id. at 193. FRCP 37(a)(3)(B)(i) permits a party to move to compel disclosure when a deponent
fails to answer a question asked. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i).
69
GMAC Bank, 248 F.R.D. at 194–95.
70
Id. at 197.
71
Id. at 193, 198.
72
GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 252 F.R.D. 253, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
73
Simmons v. Minerley, No. 5554/06, 2007 WL 2409595, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24, 2007).
74
Id. at *6.
75
Id. at *7.
76
102 F.R.D. 39, 41 (D. Md. 1983).
67
68
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behavior, the court did not order immediate sanctions. Instead, the judge
ordered that at future depositions, each interruption by either counsel
would result in a $5 penalty, and
any counsel who engages in any argument with other
counsel, makes any ad hominem comments regarding other
counsel or witnesses, or makes other extraneous remarks
shall personally pay to all other counsel attending the
deposition the sum of [five dollars] each, as liquidated
attorney’s fees and expenses, for each line or part thereof in
the transcript, of such argument, comments, or remarks.77
Clearly, courts have great leeway in drawing up the monetary sanctions
that they deem appropriate.78
B. Non-Monetary Sanctions
Courts also choose to order a wide range of non-monetary sanctions, as
several of the judges did in the cases discussed in Part II. In Saldana v.
Kmart Corp., the district court noted that “[t]o Attorney Rohn, litigation is
a form of mortal combat which she must win at any and all costs, rather
than the structured and professional mechanism civilized society has
established for peaceably resolving legitimate disputes.”79 The court
ordered Attorney Rohn to attend and complete a continuing legal education
seminar on civility, to write letters of apology to the lawyers, witnesses,
and court reporters she offended, and to pay her opponent’s costs and
attorney’s fees for pursuing the motion for sanctions.80
Surprisingly, the Third Circuit reversed, stating that because the
“language complained of in this case did not occur in the presence of the
Court and there is no evidence that it affected either the affairs of the Court
or the ‘orderly and expeditious disposition’ of any cases before it,” the
district court had abused its discretion in ordering sanctions.81 One scholar
has described the district court’s approach as an ethical one, since it was
focused on the mere fact that the remarks were made, while characterizing
the Third Circuit’s reasoning as a procedural approach because the
appellate judges were only concerning themselves with the overall impact
on the litigation.82
77

Id.
See, e.g., Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 190–91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (ordering
an attorney to pay $500 to the Clients’ Security Fund and $500 to opposing counsel for discriminatory
language).
79
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 629, 639 (V.I. 1999), rev’d in part, 260 F.3d. 228 (3d
Cir. 2001).
80
Id. at 641.
81
Saldana, 260 F.3d at 238.
82
See Piazzola, supra note 3, at 1237.
78
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In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., the
Delaware Supreme Court observed that “[t]he issue of discovery abuse,
including lack of civility and professional misconduct during depositions,
is a matter of considerable concern to Delaware courts and courts around
the nation.”83 The court noted that “[i]f a Delaware lawyer had engaged in
the kind of misconduct committed by Mr. Jamail on this record, that
lawyer would have been subject to censure or more serious sanctions.”84
Finding that there was no mechanism in place to sanction an out-of-state
lawyer not acting on a pro hac vice basis, the court ruled that Attorney
Jamail would be given thirty days to file a voluntary appearance to argue
why his obstructionist conduct “should not be considered as a bar to any
future appearance [by him] in a Delaware proceeding.”85 Mr. Jamail did
not appear in Delaware court to contest.86
In Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., the court
found the attorney’s discriminatory remarks “inherently and palpably
adverse to the goals of justice and the legal profession,” as well as a
violation of the recently amended Code of Professional Responsibility.87
The judge noted the court’s “broad discretion” to oversee discovery
including the ordering of a special referee to handle future issues and the
issuance of sanctions.88 The judge ordered a special referee to oversee
future depositions in the case, which would be held at the courthouse.89
Requiring that depositions be supervised and held at the courthouse can be
an effective solution to deposition misconduct, but it can also further clog
an already overburdened judiciary if the referee is another judge.
In Hall v. Clifton Precision, in light of the many conferences and
objections during the depositions in question, Judge Gawthrop conducted
an extensive review of the importance of focused and succinct depositions.
He stated:
[I]n short, depositions are to be limited to what they were and
are intended to be: question-and-answer sessions between a
lawyer and a witness aimed at uncovering the facts in a
lawsuit. When a deposition becomes something other than
that because of the strategic interruptions, suggestions,
statements, and arguments of counsel, it not only becomes
83

Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 (Del. 1994).
Id. at 55.
85
Id. at 56.
86
Nelson, supra note 3, at 1477 (citing Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical
Cancer in Civil Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 567 n.13 (1996)).
87
Laddcap Value Partners, LP v. Lowenstein Sandler P.C., No. 600973-2007, 2007 WL 4901555,
at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2007) (quoting Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992)).
88
Id. at *3.
89
Id. at *8.
84
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unnecessarily long, but it ceases to serve the purpose of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: to find and fix the truth.90
Instead of issuing sanctions immediately, Judge Gawthrop chose to set
forth nine orders for subsequent deposition, including:
3. Counsel shall not direct or request that a witness not
answer a question, unless that counsel has objected to the
question on the ground that the answer is protected by a
privilege or a limitation on evidence directed by the court.
4. Counsel shall not make objections or statements
which might suggest an answer to a witness. Counsels’ [sic]
statements when making objections should be succinct and
verbally economical, stating the basis of the objection and
nothing more.
5. Counsel and their witness-clients shall not engage in
private, off-the-record conferences during depositions or
during breaks or recesses, except for the purpose of deciding
whether to assert a privilege.
6. Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in
violation of, guideline (5) are a proper subject for inquiry by
deposing counsel to ascertain whether there has been any
witness-coaching and, if so, what.91

90
91

Id.

Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 531–32. The remaining orders were as follows:
1. At the beginning of the deposition, deposing counsel shall instruct the witness
to ask deposing counsel, rather than the witness’s own counsel, for clarifications,
definitions, or explanations of any words, questions, or documents presented during
the course of the deposition. The witness shall abide by these instructions.
2. All objections, except those which would be waived if not made at the
deposition under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 32(d)(3)(B), and those necessary
to assert a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to
present a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30(d), shall be
preserved. Therefore, those objections need not and shall not be made during the
course of depositions.
...
7. Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, guideline (5)
shall be noted on the record by the counsel who participated in the conference. The
purpose and outcome of the conference shall also be noted on the record.
8. Deposing counsel shall provide to the witness’s counsel a copy of all
documents shown to the witness during the deposition. The copies shall be provided
either before the deposition begins or contemporaneously with the showing of each
document to the witness. The witness and the witness’s counsel do not have the
right to discuss documents privately before the witness answers questions about
them.
9. Depositions shall otherwise be conducted in compliance with the Opinion
which accompanies this Order.
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At least one author has noted the importance of Judge Gawthrop’s decision
in Hall, calling it a “significant contribution to the case law on deposition
conduct.”92 In Heller v. Consolidated Rail Corp., a later deposition
conduct case, Judge Gawthrop emphasized that deponent’s counsel did not
have to remain “utterly mute,” explaining that counsel must periodically
“interrupt to protect [their] client from overreaching and abuse by an
opponent, provided it is done within the rules.”93
Most cases involving deposition misconduct are situations where
counsel for one party behaves badly to gain a perceived advantage over a
more civilized adversary. Sometimes, however, the misconduct goes both
ways. In AG Equipment Co. v. AIG Life Insurance Co., the court found
that “[b]oth lawyers made inappropriate speaking objections to deposition
questions and improperly instructed witnesses not to answer questions” at
several depositions.94 The court stated:
Both sides have complained about opposing counsel’s
conduct during depositions and have submitted reams of
deposition transcript pages to support their outrage. The
Court’s extensive review of these pages serves as a useful
reminder that loaded guns, sharp objects and law degrees
should be kept out of the reach of children.95
The court ultimately sanctioned both of the attorneys $250, to be paid to
the Tulsa County Bar Association for the purpose of funding a continuing
legal education course on proper deposition conduct and etiquette.96
Courts can also take more drastic steps, such as suspending an
attorney, as was the case in Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.97 Dr. Castillo’s deposition began with plaintiff’s counsel objecting to
producing a number of documents asserting privilege and claiming they
were duplicative and irrelevant.98 As the court noted, the deposition “did
not get very far . . . even though it took all day and 281 pages of
transcript,” due to the many objections of plaintiff’s counsel and the
doctor’s non-responsive answers and stonewalling.99 Judge Baker did not
find merit in the objections and stated that the conduct of plaintiff and his
attorney was “the most outrageous example of evasion and obfuscation that
I have seen in years,” and “a deliberate frustration of defendants’ attempt
92

Dickerson, supra note 1, at 292.
Heller v. Consol. Rail Corp., Civ. No. 95-3935, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11615, at *9 n.2 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 7, 1995).
94
AG Equip. Co. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-556-CVE-PJC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99915,
at *7–8 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 2008) (footnotes omitted).
95
Id. at *7.
96
Id. at *9.
97
938 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1991).
98
Id. at 778.
99
Id.
93
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100

to secure discovery.”
Judge Baker issued sanctions of over $6300 to be
paid by the plaintiff and his counsel, and ordered that the doctor answer the
questions that had not been answered at the deposition “without
interference from the doctor’s counsel.”101
At the second deposition, plaintiff’s counsel “willfully and
contumaciously disobeyed the court’s order by interfering with the
questions” and “directing the doctor not to respond to certain questions.”102
When defense counsel suggested that they call Judge Baker from the office
phone—there were no cell phones yet—to resolve the impasse, plaintiff’s
Attorney Walker responded:
MR. WALKER: I would caution you not to use any
telephones in this office unless you are invited to do so,
counsel.
MR. STANKO: You’re telling me I can’t use your
telephones?
MR. WALKER: You can write your threatening letters to
me. But, you step outside this room and touch the telephone,
and I’ll take care of that in the way one does who has
possessory rights.103
Judge Baker found Attorney Walker in contempt, dismissed the case with
prejudice, and referred the matter to a panel of judges to determine what
other discipline would be just.104 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that
Judge Baker would only have abused his discretion by not imposing
sanctions.105
The disciplinary panel stated that “Mr. Walker’s knowing, deliberate,
and willful disobedience of Judge Baker’s order is discovery abuse of a
genre never before seen by this Court. Mr. Walker’s conduct is also the
most egregious example of lawyer incivility that this Court has ever
seen.”106 Noting its inherent power and responsibility to regulate conduct
of attorneys admitted to practice, the court ordered Mr. Walker to be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and not to be
readmitted until further order of the court.107 As this was a case of first
impression, the court also specifically noted their hope that this case would
act as a deterrent, stating that this case established a new standard for
lawyers in the district “who engage in unprofessional conduct when
100

Id. at 777.
Id. at 779.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 779–80.
105
Id. at 780–81.
106
Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 828 F.Supp. 594, 600 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
107
Id. at 604.
101
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108

attending or taking depositions.”
Courts, vested with such broad
authority, can get quite inventive in determining how to punish misconduct
at depositions.109
IV. THE CONNECTICUT EXPERIENCE
Connecticut courts have sanctioning power similar to that provided by
the FRCP. As a preliminary matter, trial courts have the inherent authority
to regulate the conduct of attorneys.110 When it comes to problems with
discovery, Connecticut courts have “broad discretion” to impose sanctions
for failure to comply with discovery rules.111 Practice Book section 1314(a) provides that in the case of failing to appear or testify at a deposition,
“the judicial authority may, on motion, make such order as the ends of
justice require.”112 In addition, it has been long held that courts in
Connecticut have the inherent power to issue sanctions to enforce the rules
of court.113
In Ranfone v. Ranfone—a case brought to modify alimony payments—
the plaintiff sought sanctions for conduct at a deposition, claiming that
defense counsel improperly instructed his witness not to answer questions,
coached his witness through objections, and terminated the deposition
before it was over.114 The court found that the defense attorney had
violated Practice Book section 13-30(b) and ordered sanctions in the
amount of $1000 to be paid by the defense attorney, not his client.115 The
court declined to refer defense counsel to the Statewide Grievance
108

Id. at 603.
It is important to note that an attorney can feel the effects of a sanction—whether monetary or
non-monetary—beyond the jurisdiction where the sanction was issued.
Many jurisdictions
make the granting of pro hac vice status contingent on the applicant setting forth in an affidavit all
prior reprimands and disciplinary action taken against them, including an explanation of the relevant
circumstances. See, e.g., CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 2-16, in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra
note 35, at 103 (requiring an attorney applying for pro hac vice status to certify in an affidavit “whether
such applicant has . . . ever been reprimanded, suspended, placed on inactive status, disbarred, or
otherwise disciplined . . . and, if so, [to] set[] forth the circumstances concerning such action”).
110
See Burton v. Mottolese, 835 A.2d 998, 1017 (Conn. 2003) (noting the court’s inherent
authority to regulate conduct of members of the bar); Bergeron v. Mackler, 623 A.2d 489, 493 (Conn.
1993) (citing State v. Jones, 429 A.2d 936, 939 (Conn. 1980), overruled in part by State v. Powell, 442
A.2d 939, 944 (Conn. 1982)) (same).
111
Faile v. Zarich, No. HHDX04CV5015994S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1779, at *22–23
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2008) (quoting Ne. Sav., F.A. v. Plymouth Commons Realty Corp., 642
A.2d 1194, 1196 (Conn. 1994)).
112
CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-14(a), in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 35, at 194.
113
See Millbrook Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 776 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Conn. 2001)
(stating that “a court may, either under its inherent power to impose sanctions in order to compel
observance of its rules and orders, or under the provisions of § 13-14, impose sanctions”); Stanley v.
City of Hartford, 103 A.2d 147, 149 (Conn. 1954) (noting that “the court has inherent power to provide
for the imposition of reasonable sanctions to compel the observance of its rules”).
114
Ranfone v. Ranfone, No. FA040490123S, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1045, at *1–2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2007).
115
Id. at *6, 8.
109
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116

Committee.
Upon reconsideration, however, the court vacated the order
of sanctions, stating that “neither side is beyond reproach.”117
In a recent Connecticut Superior Court decision, a defense attorney
was sanctioned for witness coaching and deliberate obstructive conduct.118
Judge Shapiro explained in detail what kinds of objections are permitted in
a deposition. The judge noted that in Connecticut, “[e]vidence objected to
shall be taken subject to the objections. Any objection during a deposition
must be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative manner.”119 The
judge further observed that “[c]ounsel at deposition[s] cannot act
unprofessionally or interrupt or use speaking objections or testify for a
witness.”120 Judge Shapiro examined transcripts from three depositions
taken in the case, and listed several examples of witness coaching by
defense counsel including:
Q. [Plaintiffs’ counsel]: If you had been involved in Mr.
Faile’s [the decedent] care on March 22, would you expect
there to be an entry in the chart?
[Defense Counsel]: Objection to the form of the question.
Just to remind you, we don’t know if this is the whole chart.
...
Q. [Plaintiffs’ counsel]: Would there have been also an
attending cardiologist likewise on call?
A. Yes.
Q. [Plaintiffs’ counsel]: Was that Dr. Zarich that day?
A. Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Do you know that? Be careful of that
because I don’t think he was on call that day, but I could be
wrong.
...
Q. [Plaintiffs’ counsel]: Did you tell him whether he would
be admitted overnight following the procedure?
A. I’m not sure exactly what I told him at the time.

116

See id. at *8–9 (finding that the sanctions imposed “fit the conduct”).
Ranfone v. Ranfone, No. FA040490123S, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3344, at *7 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2007).
118
Faile v. Zarich, No. CV 5015994S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1779, at *1, 30 (Conn. Super.
Ct. July 10, 2008).
119
Id. at *4 (quoting CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-30(b) (2008)) (alteration in original).
120
Id. (quoting Fletcher v. PGT Trucking, Inc., No. CV 9600547653S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2794, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1998)).
117
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Q. [Plaintiffs’ counsel]: What was your practice back then,
when you had patients come in for catheterization as to how
long they would be in the hospital?
[Defense Counsel]: Objection to the form. And Mr. Faile
didn’t come in for a catheterization.121
The court found these—along with numerous other examples—to be
improper witness coaching by reminding the witness of prior testimony,
suggesting answers, and commenting on the evidence, all in violation of
Connecticut Practice Book section 13-30(b).122
As the court noted, in Connecticut, sanctions for violating a discovery
rule can be imposed if three conditions are met: “First, the order to be
complied with must be reasonably clear . . . Second, the record must
establish that the order was in fact violated . . . Third, the sanction imposed
must be proportional to the violation.”123 Ultimately, Judge Shapiro denied
the motion to preclude defense counsel from defending future depositions,
but did impose monetary sanctions against the lawyer equal to one-half of
the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees in connection with the deposition, and
ordered defense counsel not to “suggest answers, [or] make comments
about the facts of the case” at future depositions.124
After this sanction order, two subsequent depositions were taken, but
defense counsel continued to engage in obstructive tactics, thereby causing
plaintiffs’ counsel to file further motions for sanctions, to compel, and for
protective order.125 Specifically, Judge Shapiro found that defense counsel
refused to allow the deponent to answer questions without procuring a
protective order in violation of the Connecticut Practice Book and his
previous sanction order.126 Defense counsel also told plaintiffs’ counsel
several times to “ask his next question rather than allowing the witness to
answer,” ignoring the court’s previous orders.127
The court found that re-depositions—and in the case of one witness, a
third deposition—were appropriate, and determined that further sanctions
were warranted.128 Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that in addition to violating
the court’s previous sanction orders, defense counsel violated Connecticut
Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(1), 3.4(3), 3.4(4), 3.4(6), and 8.4(4).129
121

Id. at *10–11, *16–17 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
Id. at *22.
123
Id. at *2 (quoting Wexler v. DeMaio, 905 A.2d 1196, 1203–04 (Conn. 2006)) (omissions in
original).
124
Id. at *30.
125
Faile v. Zarich, No. HHDX04CV065015994S, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1600, at *1–2
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 15, 2009).
126
Id. at *7–8.
127
Id. at *8.
128
Id. at *8–11.
129
Id. at *11.
122
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The court noted that in Connecticut, a violation of a Rule of Professional
Conduct may be found “where the attorney intended to engage in the
conduct for which the attorney is sanctioned,” and that no scienter is
required.130 After considering each of the rules, the court found violations
of Rules 3.4(1), 3.4(3), and 8.4(4).131
As for the proper penalty, the court noted that disqualification is a
harsh remedy and that plaintiffs’ counsel did not meet its heavy burden of
showing that disqualification was appropriate.132 Instead, Judge Shapiro
noted that defense counsel had been sanctioned by various judges five
previous times—including his prior order in the Faile case—and that
because there were still future depositions to be conducted, further
sanctions were necessary.133 Judge Shapiro examined the plaintiffs’
claimed attorneys’ fees and determined that $7,922.87 were applicable to
the depositions and subsequent motions for sanctions.134 The court,
however, increased the amount by fifty percent “in order to attempt to
deter improper conduct in the future,” ordering that defense counsel—and
not the defendant—pay a total of $11,884.31 to plaintiffs’ counsel within
forty-five days.135 The court also put defense counsel on notice that “if
conduct . . . at future depositions is found to warrant additional
sanctions . . . the court w[ould] consider disqualification as an additional
sanction.”136 Defense counsel filed a motion to reargue and/or for
reconsideration, which Judge Shapiro denied.137
Until January 1, 2009, Practice Book section 13-30(b) stated in
pertinent part: “[A]ny objection during a deposition must be stated
concisely and in a nonargumentative manner.”138 Section 13-30(b) has
now been modified.
The old provision requiring concise and
nonargumentative objections has been removed and replaced with: “Every
130

Id. at *12.
Id. at *18. Rule 3.4 concerns fairness to opposing party and counsel. In pertinent part, Rule
3.4 provides that “[a] lawyer shall not: (1) [u]nlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence . . . ;
[or] (3) [k]nowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal.” CONN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.4, in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 35, at 1, 38. Rule 8.4 covers a wide range of
attorney misconduct, and subsection (4) specifically prohibits “[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.” CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4, in CONN.
PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 35, at 57. The court noted that conduct proscribed by Rule 3.4—which
the court found to be present—is necessarily incompatible with Rule 8.4, therefore leading to a
violation of Rule 8.4. Faile, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1600, at *17.
132
Faile, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1600, at *23. For a list of factors bearing on whether
disqualification for attorney misconduct is appropriate in Connecticut, see Briggs v. McWeeny, 796
A.2d 516, 540–41 (Conn. 2002).
133
Faile, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1600, at *25–26.
134
Id. at *37.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Faile v. Zarich, No. HHDX04CV065015994S, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2406, at *1, 39
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2009).
138
CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RULES § 13-30(b), in OFFICIAL 2008 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK
83, 192 (2008).
131
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objection raised during a deposition shall be stated succinctly and framed
so as not to suggest an answer to the deponent and, at the request of the
questioning attorney, shall include a clear statement as to any defect in
form or other basis of error or irregularity.”139 This language could have
been added in response to the Faile decision, in order to clamp down on
witness coaching through objections, or the decision in Lowell v.
Schustock, to require a clear statement of the grounds for any form
objection. The commentary to these revisions states that the changes to
section 13-30(b) were intended to “clarif[y] the procedure to be followed
in making objections during depositions.”140 It will be interesting to see
what impact this new rule has on objection procedure.
In 1983, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and, since then, forty-nine states,
the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have adopted them.141
Connecticut adopted the Model Rules—almost verbatim—in 1986,142 and
its attorneys must observe them in practice.143 Several of Connecticut’s
Rules of Professional Conduct could be used by courts when dealing with
attorneys who have misused the deposition process.144 For example, Rule
3.2 requires attorneys to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of [their] client.”145 Attorneys who prolong or
frustrate depositions could be in violation of this rule. Rule 8.4 describes
six categories of professional misconduct including: “[e]ngag[ing] in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”146 Those
employing “Rambo” tactics during depositions could obviously run afoul
of this provision. These rules can be enforced through grievances filed by
clients, other attorneys,147 or even by judges,148 each of which go to the
Statewide Grievance Committee.
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In Connecticut, discipline can also be imposed by the court without a
referral to a grievance panel. In Burton v. Mottolese, the plaintiff—an
attorney who had been disbarred by the judge with no prior disciplinary
referral—claimed that the court did not have the authority to initiate
disciplinary proceedings, arguing that the process required written
grievances submitted to the Statewide Grievance Committee.149 The
Connecticut Supreme Court determined that trial courts have the inherent
authority to discipline and regulate conduct of the members of the state
bar.150
It is clear that there are a number of methods for regulating attorney
conduct in Connecticut through the courts—through motions, using
inherent power, or using relevant Practice Book sections—or through the
Statewide Grievance Committee, but must courts intervene if they are
made aware of misconduct, or can they let the misbehavior slide in favor of
clearing their dockets? An answer to this question came in the recent
decision in Ramin v. Ramin.151
In Ramin, the Connecticut Supreme Court was faced with a situation
where a superior court judge refused to hear a plaintiff’s fifth motion for
contempt—for failing to produce a number of documents.152 Because the
trial court did not act to enforce its prior discovery orders—the subject of
the first four motions for contempt—subsequent depositions were spent
trying to uncover what the court had already ordered to be revealed,
leading to “defiant, disrespectful and uncooperative” conduct by the
defendant.153 The defendant at one point threw his wallet at plaintiff’s
counsel, used obscenities frequently, and, during one part of the
questioning, decided to read a magazine.154 The Connecticut Supreme
Court stated that the “defendant’s behavior during his deposition
exemplifies why a trial court should not refuse to sanction a noncompliant
party for failure to obey court orders.”155 The court reversed the trial court
and remanded, noting that the trial court on remand could consider
awarding attorneys’ fees against the party whose litigation misconduct
caused the fees to be incurred.156
Ramin was important enough that the Connecticut Supreme Court
issued its decision after rehearing the case en banc.157 There are no
statistics, but it would not be surprising to find that judges often let certain
149
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discovery tactics slide rather than make the client suffer for the lawyer’s
misbehavior. This is a consideration for any judge dealing with abuses of
the litigation process, but the Ramin court was clearly telling trial judges
that they can no longer ignore discovery problems that come to their
attention. The question now becomes, how should trial courts handle
discovery and, specifically, deposition misconduct?
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR HANDLING DEPOSITION MISCONDUCT
“Misconduct at depositions is not the province of one side or the
other . . . .”158 As discussed above, attorneys on both sides of a
deposition—and even deponents themselves—can be guilty of abusing the
deposition process. There have also been a number of sanctions that courts
have crafted to penalize offending attorneys and parties, but these
interventions only occur when the misconduct has reached a point where it
requires a judge’s attention. What steps can be taken to reduce the number
of times judges have to impose sanctions by deterring “Rambo” tactics
inside the deposition room in the first place?
At least one scholar has advocated for a broad “judge on call” system
to allow attorneys who encounter trouble immediate access to judicial
protection.159 Professor Cary argued that this “judge on call” system
should resemble the medical profession’s emergency care system, with
phone calls transcribed by court reporters, the judicial authority to “make
immediate rulings on behavior at the deposition,” and the authority to order
costs paid by an attorney who loses on a motion and to impose other
sanctions as the court sees fit.160 Cary admits that a judge hotline would be
expensive and time-consuming, but argues that the benefits would quickly
outweigh the costs as attorneys would modify their behavior knowing that
sanctions could come as swiftly as a phone call.161 Also weighing against
an on-call system is the likelihood that the judge who picks up the phone
would not be familiar with the case’s history or past dealings between the
attorneys during the instant case. Some districts do allow for judges to be
on call to resolve discovery disputes when they arise.162 Other judges have
ordered that future discovery be overseen by a magistrate or judge.163
Many courts have backlogged dockets, and it is likely that a “judge on
call” system would take up a great deal of judges’ time, so this approach
may have limited usefulness.
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Professor Cary also recommends that lawyers take it upon themselves
to report “Rambo” behavior to disciplinary committees with more
frequency.164 Cary notes that, often, attorneys do not want to complain, or
be seen as tattletales or weaklings who cannot handle such problems on
their own, or some lawyers decide that the behavior they encountered—
while bad—was not that bad.165 She notes, “Judges should not have to
seek out examples of Rambo litigation in the deposition transcripts filed
with the court.”166
Professor Cary further advocates for law schools to take a proactive
approach in curbing “Rambo” lawyering, as well as teaching students how
to deal with situations where they have to deal with obstructionist
tactics.167 By exploring litigation misconduct and discussing sanctions,
Cary believes that law schools can help students come up with remedies
for this unfortunate byproduct of discovery.168 This could easily be done in
required courses on ethics and professionalism. Questions on these issues
could also be added to the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination, which would further require future lawyers to learn about
deposition misconduct and the hazards of engaging in it.
When judges do become aware of deposition misconduct, they should
take quick steps to intervene and use their authority—whether statutory or
inherent—to halt the abuse. Many jurisdictions have enacted local rules—
such as those contained in Connecticut’s Practice Book and New York’s
Civil Practice Law and Rules—which give judges the power to sanction
attorneys. In Connecticut, for example, judges should use the broad power
given to them under Practice Book section 13-14 to make “such order[s] as
the ends of justice require.”169 Attorneys must know that the court will
take action against them if they abuse or obstruct depositions. What good
is a grant of power if attorneys do not think the court will actually use it?
One way to deter deposition misconduct is for a lawyer to demand that
potentially troublesome depositions be videotaped. This could easily be
ordered in response to a motion for protective order. If a deposition is
videotaped, attorneys know that their conduct will be more easily
evaluated by the judge should opposing counsel need to bring it to the
court’s attention. It is easier to tell what happened at a deposition if it has
been videotaped than it would be if a judge has to read the deposition
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transcript. The FRCP allow for videotaped depositions.
Likewise, the
Connecticut Practice Book permits videotaped depositions if any party
provides written notice.171 Connecticut judges are also permitted to order a
deposition to be videotaped upon motion.172
The usefulness of videotaped depositions is demonstrated by GMAC
Bank v. HTFC Corp.173 The two-day deposition of Mr. Wider was
videotaped and submitted to the court for use during the hearing on
sanctions. Judge Robreno conducted an extensive review of the transcript
and recordings, noting that “few depositions warrant sanctions more than
this one.”174 In addition to the abundant profanity used by Mr. Wider, the
video recording allowed the court to uncover “further indicia of Wider’s
intent to exploit and protract his deposition,” including “gleeful smirk[s]”
at his attorney, the court reporter, and even the camera itself.175 Wider also
patted himself on the back “after a particularly odious instance of
obstruction.”176 Wider’s counsel argued that his conduct was justified
because opposing counsel provoked him.177 With the clear evidence from
the video recording, Judge Robreno rejected this argument because counsel
for GMAC was clearly courteous and respectful even in the face of
relentless insults and mockery.178 The video also allowed the court to see
the true extent of Attorney Ziccardi’s failure to intervene.179
Of course it is possible to abuse video depositions, as was the case in
Kelly v. GAF Corp.180 In Kelly, one of the witnesses was unavailable for
trial so his testimony was taken by video deposition.181 As the judge
pointed out, it is important with video depositions “to keep objections and
bickering to a minimum.”182 Instead, defense counsel made numerous
“inconsequential objections,” each of which required resolution by the
court.183 If the question and answer were ruled to be excluded, the audio
was muted from the video, creating a silence for the jury.184 Since there
170
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were so many objections, the judge said the finished product was “a
hodgepodge, completely lacking in direction and continuity.”185 Judge
Ditter noted that the practice of constantly objecting during a video
deposition
provides a fertile field for mischief. An irresponsible
attorney can make any number of objections, ranging from
frivolous to spurious. The more he makes, the better things
are in his favor. When the time comes to present the
deposition in court, he can withdraw the objections or permit
them to be overruled by the court. In any event, the result is
a video presentation where there will be long pauses, a squeal
or two from the television set, and the amusing spectacle of a
witness jiggling around while the tape is speeded up until the
next usable portion of the testimony is reached.186
The judge ultimately ordered a new trial because the plaintiff was denied
the opportunity to present crucial evidence.187 While it is likely that video
recording will reduce the amount of deposition misconduct, obstructionist
tactics can still negatively impact the evidentiary value of the session,
especially when the deponent will not be in court to testify and the
recording must be played for the jury.
In the interest of avoiding further docket congestion, courts should
refer instances of deposition misconduct to state grievance or disciplinary
committees. This was the route ultimately taken in Castillo v. St. Paul
Fire.188 In Castillo, the referral panel was made up of judges, but most
jurisdictions have established committees of lawyers and laypersons to
deal with attorney misconduct. Some deposition disputes would be better
handled by a separate committee, especially when the offending actor was
the attorney and not the client.
In the unlikely event that a judge is not faced with a crowded docket,
the judge may decide that he or she wants to take an active role and choose
to hear and rule on each deposition dispute. This was the approach taken
by Judge Shapiro in Faile v. Zarich189 and Judge Miller in Lowell v.
Shustock.190 There are positives and negatives to each method, and it is not
clear which would be better at handling deposition disputes.
Another way for courts to curb deposition misconduct would be to
accept and endorse the American College of Trial Lawyers (“ACTL”)
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Code of Pretrial Conduct.
The ACTL is composed of top trial attorneys
from the United States and Canada, with membership extended by
invitation only.192 The ACTL has promulgated a set of pretrial standards to
supplement—not supplant—local and procedural rules and to provide
guidance to trial lawyers on how to handle discovery.193 According to the
preamble, a trial lawyer in pretrial proceedings “owes opposing counsel
duties of courtesy, candor, and cooperation in scheduling, serving papers,
communicating in writing and in speech, conducting discovery,
designating expert witnesses, and seeking to resolve cases without
litigation.”194
The standards themselves combine ethics with procedure, as opposed
to local rules of professional conduct or the Model Rules, which tend to
focus more on the ethical restraints on attorneys.195 Standard 5 of the
ACTL Code of Pretrial Conduct contains several tenets that lawyers should
observe in discovery practice.196 Standard 5(a)(1), for example, states that
lawyers “should strictly follow all applicable rules in drafting and
responding to written discovery and in conducting depositions.”197 Also,
with discovery practice in general, lawyers “should conduct discovery to
elicit relevant facts and evidence, and not for an improper purpose, such as
to harass, intimidate, or unduly burden another party or a witness.”198
Subsection 5(e) contains five standards to be observed when conducting
depositions, including:
(4) During a deposition, lawyers should conduct themselves
with decorum and should never verbally abuse or harass the
witness or unnecessarily prolong the deposition.199
(5) During a deposition, lawyers should strictly limit
objections to those allowed by the applicable rules. In
general, lawyers should object only to preserve the record, to
assert a valid privilege, or to protect the witness from unfair,
ambiguous, or abusive questioning. Objections should not be
used to obstruct questioning, to improperly communicate
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with the witness, or to disrupt the search for facts or evidence
germane to the case.200
It seems that these standards were created to combat the very examples of
deposition misconduct examined throughout this Note. This is probably
because the Code of Pretrial Conduct was written by distinguished trial
lawyers for trial lawyers, in light of the many problems they have faced in
this area. Pretrial standards like these should be endorsed by courts around
the country and attorneys should be held to them. Judges could even go so
far as to have the attorneys on cases before them agree on the record or
sign a form, acknowledging that they will observe these standards
throughout the case. Instances of deposition abuse will likely be reduced if
attorneys adhere to standards like these.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is, of course, the ever-present dilemma of punishing clients for
the sins of their lawyers. In 1986, the American Bar Association
Commission on Professionalism “cautioned against imposing sanctions on
innocent clients when they are not responsible for their lawyers’ improper
acts, and instead suggested that in some cases the courts should report the
misconduct to disciplinary commissions.”201 It is important that clients do
not get punished merely because they picked a “Rambo” attorney from the
phone book.
Many steps in discovery—e.g., interrogatories and
depositions—can be completed with the client completely out of the loop.
When the client is involved and the lawyer misbehaves at a deposition,
however, as Mr. Wider did in the GMAC case, there should be
consequences for the litigant.
Depositions are too important a discovery device to allow misconduct
to continue unchecked. Attorneys should be prepared to go to the court if
they encounter obstructionist tactics like those examined throughout this
Note. Judges should also become more proactive in halting deposition
abuse whenever they encounter it, whether it be through monetary
sanctions,202 issuing specific orders for future discovery,203 referrals to
grievance and disciplinary committees,204 or taking further steps to
penalize attorneys with non-monetary sanctions.205 The 1986 Commission
on Professionalism recommended that “[t]he role of the judiciary in the
conduct of litigation should be strengthened and courts should play a more
200
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decisive role earlier in the litigation process.”
The Commission also
recommended that judges impose sanctions for abuse of the litigation
process more often.207
This Note has provided several suggestions on how to curb deposition
abuse. Any deposition where misbehavior is a possibility should be
recorded by video. Video depositions will act as a deterrent for “Rambo”
tactics because any judge who reviews the recording will know exactly
what happened. Another suggestion is for judges who become aware of
deposition misconduct to refer attorneys to local grievance committees, a
powerful deterrent to future misbehavior. Jurisdictions around the country
should also endorse the standards set forth in the ACTL Code of Pretrial
Conduct. These standards, created by trial attorneys for trial attorneys,
give clear guidelines for attorneys on how to properly conduct depositions
and leave no room for abusing the process. As Judge Gawthrop stated in
Hall:
The pretrial tail now wags the trial dog. Thus, it is
particularly important that [depositions] not be abused.
Counsel should never forget that even though the deposition
may be taking place far from a real courtroom, with no blackrobed overseer peering down upon them, as long as the
deposition is conducted under the caption of this court and
proceeding under the authority of the rules of this court,
counsel are operating as officers of this court. They should
comport themselves accordingly; should they be tempted to
stray, they should remember that this judge is but a phone
call away.208
Many of the problems discussed in this Note would be far less pervasive if
more judges demonstrated Judge Gawthrop’s willingness to become
involved.
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